How to Reverse Engineer Stripped Binaries Easily Using GDB
During in the process of reverse engineering binaries, a common problem arises. How do I reverse engineer stripped binaries? There are no symbols to break on, offsets change, scripts don't work, and you ask yourself why am I doing this? Luckily there are many tricks to make this easier and to keep yourself sane. In this article, I will be discussing how to use imagebase offsets to easily debug stripped binaries.
Prerequisites
Source Code
This is the source code that I will be debugging:
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 #include <string.h>
3 #include <stdlib.h>
4
5 void init() {
6 setvbuf(stdout, 0, 2, 0);
7 setvbuf(stdin, 0, 2, 0);
8 }
9
10 void win() {
11 system("/bin/sh");
12 }
13
14 int main() {
15 int isValid;
16 char password[] = "password";
17 char input[100];
18
19 printf("Guess my password!\n");
20 scanf("%99s", input);
21
22 isValid = strcmp(input, password);
23 if (isValid == 0) {
24 printf("Access granted!\n");
25 win();
26 } else {
27 printf("Access denied.\n");
28 }
29
30 return 0;
31 }
To strip this file you can either:
Strip it while compiling:
gcc simple-pwn.c -o simple-pwn.o -s
Strip the output binary:
strip simple-pwn.o
To check if the binary is stripped, you can use the file
command:
[user@myarch]$ file simple-pwn.o
simple-pwn.o: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV),
dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2,
BuildID[sha1]=a06a70a06059d4f98e06171bc39ffb3a9ad667eb,
for GNU/Linux 4.4.0, stripped
Turning off ASLR
ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) is a security feature that randomizes memory addresses to make it harder to exploit vulnerabilities. This can be frustrating in gdb when you try to access memory addresses that no longer exist. ASLR is enabled in gdb when the setuid bit (which allows the binary to execute with the privileges of its owner) is set to true. This is common with remote desktops that you connect to; however, it's not always necessary to disable ASLR.
a) Turning off ASLR on a particular file
To disable the setuid bit on a file, either:
Direct Permission Change:
chmod u-s filename
copy it into /tmp:
cp ./filename /tmp/filename
b) Turning ASLR off system wide (sudo permission)
The value of /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
controls ASLR on your system. The command below will temporarily disable ASLR until the next restart.
echo 0 > sudo /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
The following options:
0: disabled
1: Conservative: Shared libraries and PIE binaries are randomized.
2: Conservative and start of brk area is randomized.
To turn ASLR back on:
echo 2 > sudo /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
c) Turning off ASLR while using pwntools with GDB
pwntools
is a python module that greatly aids in reverse engineering and binary exploitation. However it does load ASLR automatically even if the setuid bit is false. Fortunately, there's a parameter that disables ASLR.
>>> from pwn import *
>>> filename = '/tmp/simple-pwn.o'
>>> gdb.debug(filename,aslr=False)
Adding the Base Address to GDB
When ASLR is turned off, the base address of any binary will be fixed at 0x0000555555554000
. To set this as a variable in GDB, execute the following command:
(gdb) set $BASE = 0x0000555555554000
I highly recommend adding this line to your ~/.gdbinit
file to ensure it's set every time you run gdb.
echo 'set $BASE = 0x0000555555554000' >> ~/.gdbinit
This will be used heavily in the next section.
Using offsets
You can break at specified points in the code of a binary if you know the offset to the instructions.
Finding Offsets
a) GDB
Using GDB's built-in functions, you can find the entry address offset before the binary has run:
(gdb) info file
Symbols from "/tmp/simple-pwn.o".
Local exec file:
`/tmp/simple-pwn.o', file type elf64-x86-64.
Entry point: 0x1090
0x0000000000000318 - 0x0000000000000334 is .interp
0x0000000000000338 - 0x0000000000000378 is .note.gnu.property
0x0000000000000378 - 0x000000000000039c is .note.gnu.build-id
0x000000000000039c - 0x00000000000003bc is .note.ABI-tag
0x00000000000003c0 - 0x00000000000003e8 is .gnu.hash
0x00000000000003e8 - 0x0000000000000538 is .dynsym
0x0000000000000538 - 0x000000000000061c is .dynstr
0x000000000000061c - 0x0000000000000638 is .gnu.version
0x0000000000000638 - 0x0000000000000688 is .gnu.version_r
0x0000000000000688 - 0x0000000000000778 is .rela.dyn
0x0000000000000778 - 0x0000000000000808 is .rela.plt
0x0000000000001000 - 0x000000000000101b is .init
0x0000000000001020 - 0x0000000000001090 is .plt
0x0000000000001090 - 0x0000000000001296 is .text
0x0000000000001298 - 0x00000000000012a5 is .fini
0x0000000000002000 - 0x0000000000002043 is .rodata
0x0000000000002044 - 0x0000000000002078 is .eh_frame_hdr
0x0000000000002078 - 0x0000000000002134 is .eh_frame
0x0000000000003dd0 - 0x0000000000003dd8 is .init_array
0x0000000000003dd8 - 0x0000000000003de0 is .fini_array
0x0000000000003de0 - 0x0000000000003fc0 is .dynamic
0x0000000000003fc0 - 0x0000000000003fe8 is .got
0x0000000000003fe8 - 0x0000000000004030 is .got.plt
0x0000000000004030 - 0x0000000000004040 is .data
0x0000000000004040 - 0x0000000000004060 is .bss
From here you can find where the instructions are stored, by looking at the offset at 'Entry Point: 0x1090'. The instruction offset's of the binary can now be found:
(gdb) x/20i 0x1090
0x1090: endbr64
0x1094: xor ebp,ebp
0x1096: mov r9,rdx
0x1099: pop rsi
0x109a: mov rdx,rsp
0x109d: and rsp,0xfffffffffffffff0
0x10a1: push rax
0x10a2: push rsp
0x10a3: xor r8d,r8d
0x10a6: xor ecx,ecx
0x10a8: lea rdi,[rip+0x133] # 0x11e2
0x10af: call QWORD PTR [rip+0x2f0b] # 0x3fc0
0x10b5: hlt
0x10b6: cs nop WORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
0x10c0: lea rdi,[rip+0x2f79] # 0x4040 <stdout>
0x10c7: lea rax,[rip+0x2f72] # 0x4040 <stdout>
0x10ce: cmp rax,rdi
0x10d1: je 0x10e8
0x10d3: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rip+0x2eee] # 0x3fc8
0x10da: test rax,rax
b) objdump
objdump is a command-line utility that displays the machine code of a binary in assembly language along with its offsets.
[user@myarch Articles]$ objdump -d -M intel -j .text simple-pwn.o
simple-pwn.o: file format elf64-x86-64
Disassembly of section .text:
0000000000001090 <.text>:
1090: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
1094: 31 ed xor ebp,ebp
1096: 49 89 d1 mov r9,rdx
1099: 5e pop rsi
109a: 48 89 e2 mov rdx,rsp
109d: 48 83 e4 f0 and rsp,0xfffffffffffffff0
10a1: 50 push rax
10a2: 54 push rsp
10a3: 45 31 c0 xor r8d,r8d
10a6: 31 c9 xor ecx,ecx
10a8: 48 8d 3d 33 01 00 00 lea rdi,[rip+0x133]
10af: ff 15 0b 2f 00 00 call QWORD PTR [rip+0x2f0b]
10b5: f4 hlt
10b6: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 cs nop WORD PTR [rax+rax*1+0x0]
...
c) Getting offsets with a Decompiler (Ghidra)
All good decompilers provide a method to determine the offset of an instruction from the base of the binary. In Ghidra, you can easily get the offset of an assembly instruction by hovering over it.
The offset we need is the 'Imagebase Offset,' which is +1230h
or 0x1230
.
Using the offsets
Once the offset is found, it can be added to the $BASE
variable to get its runtime memory address. For example, the runtime instruction address for 'call scanf' can be found by adding its offset (0x1230
) to the base address.
For help, type "help".
Type "apropos word" to search for commands related to "word"...
Reading symbols from ./simple-pwn.o...
(No debugging symbols found in ./simple-pwn.o)
(gdb) p/x $BASE + 0x1230
$1 = 0x555555555230
The address 0x555555555230
is the runtime address for the 'call scanf' instruction. This address can then be used for a breakpoint.
(gdb) b *($BASE + 0x1230)
Breakpoint 1 at 0x555555555230
(gdb) r
Starting program: /tmp/simple-pwn.o
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/usr/lib/libthread_db.so.1".
Guess my password!
Breakpoint 1, 0x0000555555555230 in ?? ()
(gdb)
Addresses created by the offset and $BASE
can be used for all other functions of gdb, such as call, watch, jump, etc.
Conclusion
Thanks for reading this article, I hope it is useful for you. If you have any questions you can dm me at @dingo418. If you have any other gdb tips that you think would be useful for people to know, let me know.
Credits:
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