D-Link Router Vulnerabilities Remain Under Attack by Botnets

FortiGuard Labs observed a spike in the activity of two different botnets - Ficora and Capsaicin - in October and November 2024. These botnets typically spread through vulnerabilities in D-Link devices, allowing attackers to execute malicious commands remotely.

Impact Level

  • Affected Devices:

    • D-Link DIR-645 RevAx wired/wireless routers with firmware 1.04b12 and earlier

    • D-Link DIR-806 devices. D-Link GO-RT-AC750 GORTAC750_revA_v101b03 and GO-RT-AC750_revB_FWv200b02

    • D-Link DIR-845L routers v1.01KRb03 and earlier

  • Related CVEs:

    • CVE-2015-2051

    • CVE-2019-10891

    • CVE-2022-37056

    • CVE-2024-33112

  • Affected Users: Any organization

  • Impact Level: Attackers can gain control of remote systems

  • Severity: High

When a device is successfully exploited, attackers leverage weaknesses in the D-Link management interface (HNAP) to execute malicious commands through GetDeviceSettings.

The botnets can steal data and execute shell scripts. The attackers' goal seems to be using the devices for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.

The Ficora botnet primarily targets the Japanese and U.S. markets. Meanwhile, Capsaicin appears to mainly target devices in East Asian countries and has increased its activity for two days, starting from October 21.

Figure 1: IPS Telemetry.

Figure 1. IPS attack metrics

Ficora Botnet

Ficora is a newer variant of the Mirai botnet, designed to exploit specific vulnerabilities in D-Link devices.

Figure 2: “FICORA” Telemetry.

Figure 2. Ficora botnet activity range

After gaining initial access to D-Link devices, Ficora uses a shell script named 'multi' to download and execute its payload through various methods such as wget, curl, ftpget, and tftp, then deletes itself from the victim's system.

Figure 4: Malicious “FICORA” command exploiting a D-Link vulnerability.

Figure 3. Malicious command exploiting a D-Link vulnerability to download “FICORA” malware

This malware uses brute-force methods with predefined username and password lists to infect multiple Linux-based devices, supporting various hardware architectures.

Figure 11: Hard-coded username list.

Figure 4. Predefined username list

Figure 12: Hard-coded password list.

Figure 5. Predefined password list

Regarding DDoS attack capabilities, it supports UDP flooding, TCP flooding, and DNS amplification, diversifying attack methods to counter defense systems.

Capsaicin Botnet

Capsaicin is a variant of the Kaiten botnet and is believed to be malware developed by the Keksec group, known for the “EnemyBot” malware and many other malware families targeting Linux devices. Fortinet discovered Capsaicin in a series of attacks from October 21 to 22, primarily targeting East Asian countries.

The infection occurs through a download script (“bins.sh”), which downloads binary files prefixed with 'yakuza' for different hardware architectures, including arm, mips, sparc, and x86.

Figure 16: Malicious “CAPSAICIN” command targeting a D-Link Vulnerability.

Figure 6. Malicious command exploiting a D-Link vulnerability to download “CAPSAICIN” malware

Additionally, this malware actively searches for other botnets operating on the same server and disables them.

Besides DDoS capabilities similar to Ficora, Capsaicin can also collect server information and transmit it to a command and control (C2) server for monitoring.

Figure 24: C2 commands.

Figure 7. List of commands for C2 execution

Figure 25: DDoS attack commands.

Figure 8. List of commands for DDoS execution

List of IOCs related to FICORA and CAPSAICIN malware

URLs

FICORA

hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/multi
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.arc
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.arm
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.arm5
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.arm6
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.arm7
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.m68k
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.mips
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.mipsel
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.powerpc
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.sh4
hxxp://103[.]149[.]87[.]69/la.bot.sparc

CAPSAICIN

hxxp://87[.]11[.]174[.]141/bins.sh
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.yak.sh
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.arm5
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.arm6
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.arm7
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.i586
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.i686
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.m68k
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.mips
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.mipsel
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.ppc
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.sparc
hxxp://pirati[.]abuser[.]eu/yakuza.x86
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/bins.sh
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.sh
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.arm4
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.arm5
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.arm6
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.arm7
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.i586
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.i686
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.m68k
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.mips
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.mipsel
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.ppc
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.sparc
hxxp://87[.]10[.]220[.]221/yakuza.x86

Hosts

103[.]149[.]87[.]69
ru[.]coziest[.]lol
f[.]codingdrunk[.]cc
www[.]codingdrunk[.]in
eighteen[.]pirate
nineteen[.]libre
75cents[.]libre
2joints[.]libre
fortyfivehundred[.]dyn
21savage[.]dyn
imaverygoodbadboy[.]libre
le[.]codingdrunk[.]in
87[.]11[.]174[.]141
pirati[.]abuser[.]eu
87[.]10[.]220[.]221
45[.]86[.]86[.]60
194[.]110[.]247[.]46

Files

Downloader

ValueType
f71dc58cc969e79cb0fdfe5163fbb9ed4fee5e13cc9407a11d231601ee4c6e23SHA-256
ea83411bd7b6e5a7364f7b8b9018f0f17f7084aeb58a47736dd80c99cfeac7f1SHA-256
48a04c7c33a787ef72f1a61aec9fad87d6bd9c49542f52af7e029ac83475f45dSHA-256
18c92006951f93a77df14eca6430f32389080838d97c9e47364bf82f6c21a907SHA-256

FICORA

ValueType
9b161a32d89f9b19d40cd4c21d436c1daf208b5d159ffe1df7ad5fd1a57610e5SHA-256
faeea9d5091384195e87caae9dd88010c9a2b3b2c88ae9cac8d79fd94f250e9fSHA-256
10d7aedc963ea77302b967aad100d7dd90d95abcdb099c5a0a2df309c52c32b8SHA-256
7f6912de8bef9ced5b9018401452278570b4264bb1e935292575f2c3a0616ec4SHA-256
a06fd0b8936f5b2370db5f7ec933d53bd8a1bf5042cdc5c052390d1ecc7c0e07SHA-256
764a03bf28f9eec50a1bd994308e977a64201fbe5d41337bdcc942c74861bcd3SHA-256
df176fb8cfbc7512c77673f862e73833641ebb0d43213492c168f99302dcd5e3SHA-256
ac2df391ede03df27bcf238077d2dddcde24cd86f16202c5c51ecd31b7596a68SHA-256
ca3f6dce945ccad5a50ea01262b2d42171f893632fc5c5b8ce4499990e978e5bSHA-256
afee245b6f999f6b9d0dd997436df5f2abfb3c8d2a8811ff57e3c21637207d62SHA-256
ec508df7cb142a639b0c33f710d5e49c29a5a578521b6306bee28012aadde4a8SHA-256

CAPSAICIN

ValueType
8349ba17f028b6a17aaa09cd17f1107409611a0734e06e6047ccc33e8ff669b0SHA-256
b3ad8409d82500e790e6599337abe4d6edf5bd4c6737f8357d19edd82c88b064SHA-256
ec87dc841af77ec2987f3e8ae316143218e9557e281ca13fb954536aa9f9caf1SHA-256
784c9711eadceb7fedf022b7d7f00cff7a75d05c18ff726e257602e3a3ccccc1SHA-256
bde6ef047e0880ac7ef02e56eb87d5bc39116e98ef97a5b1960e9a55cea5082bSHA-256
c7be8d1b8948e1cb095d46376ced64367718ed2d9270c2fc99c7052a9d1ffed7SHA-256
4600703535e35b464f0198a1fa95e3668a0c956ab68ce7b719c28031d69b86ffSHA-256
6e3ef9404817e168c974000205b27723bc93abd7fbf0581c16bb5d2e1c5c6e4aSHA-256
32e66b87f47245a892b102b7141d3845540b270c278e221f502807758a4e5deeSHA-256
540c00e6c0b53332128b605b0d5e0926db0560a541bb13448d094764844763dfSHA-256
b74dbd02b7ebb51700f3c5900283e46570fe497f9b415d25a029623118073519SHA-256
148f6b990fc1f1903287cd5c20276664b332dd3ba8d58f2bf8c26334c93c3af5SHA-256
464e2f1faab2a40db44f118f7c3d1f9b300297fe6ced83fabe87563fc82efe95SHA-256
b699cd64b9895cdcc325d7dd96c9eca623d3ec0247d20f39323547132c8fa63bSHA-256
1007f5613a91a5d4170f28e24bfa704c8a63d95a2b4d033ff2bff7e2fe3dcffeSHA-256
7a815d4ca3771de8a71cde2bdacf951bf48ea5854eb0a2af5db7d13ad51c44abSHA-256
d6a2a22000d68d79caeae482d8cf092c2d84d55dccee05e179a961c72f77b1baSHA-256
7ab36a93f009058e60c8a45b900c1c7ae38c96005a43a39e45be9dc7af9d6da8SHA-256
803abfe19cdc6c0c41acfeb210a2361cab96d5926b2c43e5eb3b589a6ed189adSHA-256
7b29053306f194ca75021952f97f894d8eae6d2e1d02939df37b62d3845bfdb7SHA-256
59704cf55b9fa439d6f7a36821a50178e9d73ddc5407ff340460c054d7defc54SHA-256
aaa49b7b4f1e71623c42bc77bb7aa40534bcb7312da511b041799bf0e1a63ee7SHA-256
1ca1d5a53c4379c3015c74af2b18c1d9285ac1a48d515f9b7827e4f900a61bdeSHA-256

Recommendations

FPT Threat Intelligence recommends organizations and individuals take several measures to prevent this campaign:

  • Update device firmware: Ensure that routers and IoT devices are always running the latest firmware version to patch known security vulnerabilities.

  • Replace old devices: If a device has reached the end of its life cycle and no longer receives security updates, replace it with a new model.

  • Change default passwords: Use strong and unique admin passwords, and disable remote access interfaces if not necessary.

References

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Written by

Tran Hoang Phong
Tran Hoang Phong

Just a SOC Analysis ^^