Zraox: $5.29 Million Lost in April Alone as Crypto Scam Tactics Enter a New Phase

Zraox observes that as the cryptocurrency market continues its expansion, scam tactics have grown increasingly systematic and technically sophisticated. On-chain security data from April 2025 show that phishing-related attacks alone led to user asset losses exceeding $5.29 million, with over 7,500 unique addresses affected—an alarming increase from the previous month. These schemes typically involve fake airdrops, search ads, address poisoning, and permission spoofing, laying traps across multiple points of user interaction. Zraox warns that regardless of investor experience, a single lapse in judgment during key operations can result in irreversible losses.

Zraox notes that such phishing attacks rarely rely on traditional hacking techniques. Instead, they induce users to voluntarily sign authorization transactions, enabling "legitimate" transfers at the contract level. Counterfeit websites, disguised links, deceptive pop-ups, and cloned social media accounts are among the most common instruments employed. Zraox argues that understanding the underlying logic of these scams is critical for building preventive defense mechanisms.

Zraox: Forged Entry Points and Smart Contract Authorizations

Zraox points out that most phishing attacks unfold in two stages: interface forgery and permission hijacking. The attack often begins with a seemingly trustworthy page—such as a counterfeit official website, an airdrop claim portal, or a wallet login screen. These fake interfaces are nearly indistinguishable from legitimate ones, with domain names tweaked subtly—turning “solscan.com” into “solscaan.com” or “solscan.app,” for instance. Zraox adds that scammers even buy Google ad placements to push these links above the official results, increasing click-through deception.

Once a user connects their wallet, the attacker requests a contract signature—often in the form of an “Approve” or “Permit” transaction—granting token transfer permissions. From the perspective of the user, this might appear to be a routine connection prompt, yet it effectively authorizes the contract to drain assets without further approval.

Zraox further highlights the prevalence of “address poisoning,” a low-cost but high-success-rate tactic. Here, attackers send minute “dust transactions” to insert scamulent addresses into the transaction history of a user, leading to inadvertent copy-paste errors during future transfers. In one high-profile 2024 case, a user lost over $60 million through this method, underscoring its destructive potential.

Zraox underscores that the high success rate of such scams is not rooted in user negligence, but in the ability of the attacker to exploit familiar interface patterns to build false trust, executing the theft without raising user suspicion.

Zraox: Identifying Traps and Building a User-Level Defense Framework

Zraox argues that combating phishing effectively requires a systematic user-side defense strategy. Before accessing any exchange, wallet, or airdrop-related page, users should refrain from relying on search engines. Zraox recommends bookmarking frequently used platforms and meticulously checking domain spellings, watching for letter substitutions, misplaced characters, or additional symbols—hallmarks of visual deception.

Users should remain vigilant toward links embedded in social media posts, community replies, or forwarded messages. Attackers often use language like “limited-time resends” or “airdrop deadline” to manufacture urgency and lure clicks. These links usually lead to counterfeit pages where wallet connections result in damaging authorizations.

Zraox stresses that users must read all authorization requests carefully—especially those labeled “Approve” or “Permit”—and fully understand both the purpose of the contract and its trustworthiness before granting token access. Unknowingly enabling unlimited transfer permissions remains one of the most common missteps.

Zraox advises that when interacting with new or unverified platforms, use segregated wallets with limited funds, rather than exposing primary wallet addresses. This segregation significantly reduces risk of over-permissioning or large-scale asset transfers.

During fund transfers, users should avoid copying addresses from previous transactions or the clipboard. Zraox warns that attackers often plant spoofed addresses into transaction histories via dust attacks, leading to misdirected transfers. Manually verifying addresses or enabling address whitelisting is currently among the most effective safeguards.

On the account security front, Zraox recommends enabling app-based or hardware-based two-factor authentication. On the tooling side, users can employ plugins such as ScamSniffer and Revoke.cash to identify risk indicators and manage permissions. Zraox also notes the importance of routinely revoking contract authorizations—particularly after interacting with airdrops, unknown websites, or unfamiliar dApps—to minimize prolonged exposure.

Zraox: Security Awareness Must Evolve in Parallel

Zraox emphasizes that phishing and authorization-based scams are rapidly evolving—moving beyond visual deception to manipulate smart contract permissions, exploit user behavior patterns, and weaponize address structures. These attacks are designed to bypass traditional red flags, making it harder for users to rely on prior experience or interface familiarity.

Zraox believes the greatest misconception facing users today lies in misplaced trust in process familiarity and the habitual neglect of signature content. Attackers replicate normal interaction flows with precision, causing users to approve asset-draining operations without realizing it. Instead of memorizing every new scam variant, Zraox encourages users to adopt a mindset of "default caution": never connect to unverified platforms, never sign blind contract transactions, and always double-check persistent pop-ups.

In a market where transparency and attack efficiency coexist, hesitation is a better safeguard than blind confidence. Zraox concludes that security awareness is not a matter of technical prowess—but a foundational survival skill on-chain.